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Department Editor: Walter H. Wager*
REPORT ON AIR TRANSPORTATION OF AVIATION SECURITIES
COMMITTEE OF INVESTMENT BANKERS ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA**
I.-NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDUSTRY
T HE Civil Aeronautics Act, which provides the charter under which
the air transport industry operates, is a basically sound piece of legis-
lation, although its past administration has been far from ideal. With the
passage of this Act in 1938, the Congress established our certificated air-
lines (domestic and international) as 'a regulated public service industry.
As a regulated business, the airlines give up the right to set fares with-
out the approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board, to operate when and where
they please, and to quickly withdraw service which they find unprofitable.
In return for accepting these restrictions, they gain two important theoreti-
cal advantages - advantages which can become practical if the Act is ag-
gressively and intelligently administered.
First: The certificated airlines are protected against unauthorized com-
petition. The degree of competition authorized by the CAB to date has
depended on the philosophy of the membership of the Board, the aggressive-
ness of the industry in requesting new routes, and the supposed outlook for
the growth of air traffic.
In retrospect, the degree of competition allowed in the past few years
appears to have been excessive. One of the main problems which now con-
fronts the industry and the Board is how already certificated competition
can be reduced.
In addition, the domestic airlines are subject to fairly heavy but prob-
ably temporary competition from "non-scheduled" freight and passenger
lines. Our international certificated airlines are subject to competition
from foreign flag airlines as well as from other American carriers.
Second: The certificated airlines are clearly entitled to sufficient financial
support (mail payments) from the government to permit them, if honestly,
-economically and efficiently managed, to earn an adequate return on their
invested capital, even though these mail payments may have to be so high
as to contain a significant element of subsidy. To quote the Act:
"In determining the (mail) rates in each case the Authority shall take
into consideration, among other factors ... the need for each carrier for
compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the per-
formance of such service and, together with all other revenues of the air
carrier, to enable such air carrier to maintain and continue the develop-
ment of air transportation to the extent and of the character and quality
required for the commerce of the United States, its Postal Service and
the National Defense."
The amount of financial support granted through mail rates has depended
on the philosophy of the Board, its judgment as to the probable future trend
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of traffic and costs, the enthusiasm with which the Post Office Department
(in whose budget the funds for air mail payments are included) defends the
appropriation requests before the Committees of Congress, and the willing-
ness of the Congress to appropriate the necessary funds. Congressional
attitudes have been influenced, among other things, by the state of the
national budget, the philosophy of the party in power, pressures from com-
petitive surface transport industries, and the importance currently placed
on air transport as a factor in national defense.
Mail payments in the past few years have been inadequate, but, as out-
lined later, there are reasons to believe that they will be substantially in-
creased in the near future.
In evaluating the degree to which the airlines are dependent on govern-
ment assistance, it is important to remember that the cost to the govern-
ment of the air mail service, since it was started in 1918, has been almost
entirely offset by stamp revenue.
Airmail Payments and Revenues-1918-1947
Receipts from stamps on air mail letters ............ $539 million
Payments to airlines for carrying air mail ........... 405 million
Allocable Post Office Dept. overhead ................ 183 million
Total Cost of Air Mail ......................... 588 million
Deficit ................................ ......... 49 m illion
Despite this excellent showing over the past three decades, it is probable
that air mail payments over the next few years will contain a substantial
element of subsidy.
If the air transport industry is to show reasonable earnings over the
near term future, air mail payments to our domestic carriers will probably
have to be doubled, and payments to our international carriers substantially
increased. Such increases are entirely consistent with the terms of the
Civil Aeronautics Act, but they will mean that mail payments plus allocable
Post Office overhead will be for a few years far above revenues from stamp
sales. The period of deficits should not be unduly prolonged, however, for
there is every probability that mail rates can again be slowly reduced once
the industry is established on a sound financial basis.
In addition to payments for carrying the mail, the Federal Government
since 1938 has expended over $400 millions on the construction and operation
of airways facilities, and the government and the municipalities have spent
$1,300 millions on the construction of civil airports, a large part of which
were for the benefit of the certificated airlines.
Our domestic and international airlines are of major direct and indirect
value to our national defense. Their importance in this sphere more than
justifies the government aid they receive, entirely apart from the obvious
reasons- for assisting air transportation as an infant industry.
In war, when high-speed transportation and communication are of par-
ticularly vital importance, the airlines are a key segment of our transpor-
tation system. In addition, by furnishing trained personnel, and through
contract operations, they provide an invaluable nucleus for building up the
necessary military and naval air transport services.
Air transportation is also of fundamental importance to our domestic
and foreign commerce. In the first six months of 1948 United States domes-
tic airlines carried a volume of passenger traffic equal to 44.1% of Pullman
traffic. Across the North Atlantic, our international airlines will carry 70%
of the total air traffic, and total air passenger volume will be equal to 50%
of first class steamship traffic.
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In domestic service air transport is two to six times as fast as the fastest
surface transport. On the ocean, it is five times as fast as the fastest steam-
ships and ten times as fast as the average passenger liner.
Obviously, a method of transportation carrying such large volumes of
traffic and offering such a great speed advantage over competitive methods
is a most useful tool for all forms of commerce.
When both its national defense and its commercial importance is consid-
ered, it is clear that the aggressive support of air transportation envisaged
in the Civil Aeronautics Act is in the national interest.
The following quotations from the reports of the President's Air Policy
Commission and the Congressional Aviation Policy Board bear out this
conclusion:
President's Air Policy Commission:
"The air lines .. are passing through one of the most serious crises of
their history. .. This situation is significant for two reasons. If not
relieved it will contribute to the rapid deterioration of air line service
to the public. A second reason is now of even greater importance. The
air lines have a fleet of aircraft of great value to the military services
as a reserve in time of war. As a potential military auxiliary, the air
lines must be kept strong and healthy."
"We must. consider that direct government financial aid to commercial
air lines is.fully justified on grounds of national security, and economic
welfare. We believe the air transport system of this country can, with
such aid now, become self-supporting in the future. We are convinced
that any impartial investigators of air transport would endorse the use
of public funds to obtain such a sound air transport system. This means
the continued granting of subsidies to air lines for an additional period."
Congressional Aviation Policy Board:
"National security requires a financially sound, operationally efficient,
and technically modern air transport industry."
II.-WAR TIME PROSPERITY AND POST WAR DIFFICULTIES
Between 1941 and 1946 the gross revenues of the domestic airlines in-
creased over three fold, and during the last three years they have increased
a further 20%. However, as indicated in the following table, this expansion
in business has been accompanied by an extremely erratic earnings record.
Revenues, Earnings and Security Prices of Certificated
Domestic Air Lines*
Total Cost Per Oper- Air Transport
Gross Mail % Pass. Avail. Oper- ating Stock Price Ave.:
Rev. Rev.a Mail Load Ton Mile ating Income (Dow Jones)
(000) (000) Total Factor Cents Ratio (000) High Low Close
1941 $ 97,309 22,696 23.2 59.1 27.7 92.4 $ 7,390 26.6 17.8 18.6
1942 108,148 23,447 21.7 72.2 31.3 77.9 23,782 29.9 13.4 29.1
1943 122,995 24,103 19.6 88.0 36.9 77.8 27,432 43.5 27.9 33.9
1944 160,928, 33,317 20.7 89.4 36.4 78.4 36,406 45.8 32.7 45.8
1945 214,743 33,693 15.7 88.1 34.6 84.0 34,417 91.7 45.1 84.6
1946 311,500 21,015 6.7 78.8 32.3 101.8 (5,621) 86.3 39.3 41.0
1947 352,490 29,089 8.2 65.7 30.9 105.9 (20,900) 46.2 30.0 30.6
1948 418,003 b47,747 11.4 58.5 30.5 99.5 (2,292) 39.2 25.6 29.0
* Feeder lines omitted. See appendix. ( ) Loss
a Includes retroactive mail revenue applicable under CAB note orders and
"Show Cause" orders issued through April 21, 1949.
b Includes the following amounts in retroactive mail payments awarded in 1948:
Capital $1,491,906; Inland $75,050; Mid-Continent $183,775; National $329,762;
Northwest $2,100,658; T.W.A. $1,761,692; United $1,913,235; Western $975,461.
American also received award, but did not indicate amount included.
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The industry reported high profits, thanks to abnormally favorable con-
ditions, during the war years. Net operating income increased from $7
millions in 1941 to a peak of $36 millions in 1944, and the operating ratio
fell from 92 in 1941 to 78 in 1942 and 1943.
This good showing was primarily due to an abnormally high density of
passenger traffic. Gross passenger revenues rose only 68% between 1941
and 1944 because the airlines were unable to obtain additional equipment to
handle increasing traffic. But under war conditions people were willing to
travel at any hour of the day or night, and thanks to their rush to fill the
few available seats the industry load factor rose to 90% as compared to the
normal prewar figure of 55-60%. Air mail revenues increased some 50%
between 1941 and 1944 and, in addition, the airlines performed profitable
contract services for the military.
From a net operating income of $34 millions in 1945, domestic airlines
earnings fell to an operating loss of nearly $6 millions in 1946. In 1947,
and the first half of 1948, the industry lost an additional $31 millions. While
the total loss in these last eighteen months is less than half depreciation
charges of $65 millions, it is nevertheless extremely serious.
This poor showing in a period when most American industries have been
reporting record profits has been due in large part to major mistakes on the
part of both the airline managements and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Fortunately most of. these mistakes are well on the way to correction and,
except for the excessive granting of new routes, will not impede the future
development of the business. They are summarized below:
(1) Overestimating the probable growth of traffic.
(2) Hiring of an excessive number of personnel and purchasing an ex-
cessive number of aircraft to cope with the expected increased
traffic.
(3) Insufficient control of costs during this expansion period.
(4) Grounding of new types of aircraft (due to remediable defects) for
many months which resulted in heavy loss of revenue.
(5) Major strikes which resulted in heavy losses for the airlines affected.
(6) Excessive granting of new routes by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
(7) Reduction of both mail and passenger rates on the erroneous assump-
tion that traffic would greatly increase and costs decline.
(8) Inability to markedly reduce costs in the face of the rising price
level despite the introduction of more efficient aircraft.
A long essay might be written on each of these problems but for the
purpose of this report a discussion of the two most important-points 1 and
7-should prove sufficient. (Point 6 is analyzed in some detail in a later
section.)
Most of the industry's difficulties stem from over-estimating the probable
growth of traffic, an error which was shared by the CAB. It was commonly
expected that air passenger travel would continue to show a steady increase
of 25-30% until well into the 1950s.
These optimistic estimates failed to give adequate weight to the fact that
total war-time travel was inflated to an extraordinary degree and, there-
fore, did not provide a sound basis for projecting future travel trends.
Further errors were made in assuming that the airlines would greatly im-
prove their safety and regularity and sharply reduce their costs in the
immediate post-war period. Neither of these goals has been reached.
Actually, instead of increasing spectacularly, airline travel has held about
steady since 1946 while Pullman travel has declined about 35% between
1946 and 1948.
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Air and Pullman Traffic -'1940-1948
(million passenger miles)
Air % of Total
Pullman Air Air and Pullman
1940 7,243 1,052 12.7
1946 20,672 5,903 22.2
1947 13,516 6,011 30.7
1948 12,172 5,823 32.4
This is an excellent comparative showing and has resulted in a growing
penetration of the total long distance travel market by the airlines, but is
far below what both the airlines and the CAB expected.
In 1945, the CAB faced with high airline earnings and estimates of
rapidly increasing traffic, and with the introduction of new and supposedly
more economical equipment, became convinced that if the air mail payments
to the larger carriers were not reduced, they would soon be making excessive
profits. As a result, in 1945, the mail rates of the "Big Five" were cut from
60 cents per ton mile to 45 cents per ton mile. In addition to the cut in
rates, total air mail volume declined from 65 million ton miles in 1945 to
33 million ton miles in 1946, due to the practical disappearance of soldiers'
mail that came with the demobilization. Mail payments to the industry
consequently fell from $34 million in 1945 to $20 million in 1946 and $23
million in 1947. This latter figure is little higher than in 1940 when the
total gross revenues of the industry were but one-sixth of the 1947 level.
The average mail rate for the industry as a whole in 1947 was only 70.9
cents per ton mile as compared with $1.74 in 1941.
The assumptions on which the CAB based this reduction in mail pay
turned out to be wholly unfounded. Far from enjoying excessive profits,
the industry as we have seen, has reported large losses since 1946, due in
part to expenditures in preparing for a heavy increase in traffic which failed
to materialize.
In retrospect, it is clear that the CAB should have actually increased mail
rates as the volume of mail traffic declined from the war-time peak, to per-
mit the industry to show sufficient earnings to raise the equity capital nec-
essary to buy new aircraft and modernize its ground facilities.
In addition to reducing air mail rates, the CAB took the initiative in
encouraging the industry to reduce passenger fares (although certain major
airlines were also anxious to reduce fares). There was general agreement
that lower fares were necessary to open up the "mass transportation market"
to the airlines and it was felt that the introduction of the new, more efficient
types of aircraft would reduce costs sufficiently to make the lower rates
economically feasible. The industry's average passenger fare fell from
4.95 cents per passenger mile in 1945 to 4.76 cents in 1946.
III. - SPECIAL SITUATION OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
Space prevents detailed treatment of the problem of the international air-
lines. However, the following table gives basic figures for their operations
for the fiscal years 1942-1948 which may be compared in a general way with
the results of the domestic carriers.'
1 One major international carrier is also a domestic airline, the results of
whose foreign and domestic operations are consolidated in its annual report.
Another is 62% owned by a domestic airline. Two other domestic lines are just
beginning international operations.
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Certificated International Airlines Revenues and Earnings
U.S. Mail
Fiscal Revenues
Years Total U.S. Mail as Pct. of Passenger Operating
Ending Revenues Revenues" Total Load Profit
June30 (000) (000) Revenues Factor (000)
1942 $ 44,152 $15,360 34.79% 67.92% $ 9,082
1943 38,764 4,778 12.33 78.10 2,711
1944 37,505 3,036 8.09 79.31 2,143
1945 50,000 5,773 11.55 78.01 435
1946 95,437 10,096 10.58 77.79 6,695
1947 164,194 16,450 10.02 63.47 (16,015)
1948 224,057 42,248 18.86 59.50 534
The sharp increase in gross revenues from $95 millions in 1946 to $224
millions in 1948 is due to the opening of normal post war service to foreign
countries, particularly on the North Atlantic. It should also be noted that
this branch of the industry showed large losses in only one year (1947), and
actually reported a small profit for 1948. This is due in part to more liberal
mail pay treatment by the CAB.
Substantial retroactive mail payments to our international carriers, and
an increase in their rates for future service, are expected to be announced
by the CAB in the near future.
Our international airlines must meet heavy competition from foreign
carriers and, in addition, compete with other American carriers on important
routes. Since all certificates to American carriers on the North Atlantic are
temporary ones, expiring in 1953, there will be an opportunity to review the
competitive situation at that time.
IV. - FINANCING OF THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY - 1940-1947
Bonds and Proceeds
Calendar Debentures Proceeds Common
Year (000) Notes* Pfd. Stock Stock Total
1940
1941 None 4,756 1,875 1,115 7,786
1942 None 1,504 None None 1,504
1943 None 205 10,503 7,250 17,958
1944 None 296 None 3,802 4,098
1945 40,000 6,837 None 6,422 53,259
1946 50,000 26,986 40,800 12,333 130,119
1947 22,000 44,390 19,227 3,813 89,430
In 1945, when the industry's total assets were only $253 million, it was
estimated that the airlines would expend $750 million over the next five years
for the purchase of new aircraft, ground facilities, etc.
A responsible study made at the time indicated that this sum would be
obtained as follows:
Millions of Dollars
Retained earnings .................. 80
Depreciation .......................... 170
Sale of equity securities ................. 150
New debt ............................. 350
T otal ............................... 750
Loss.
&U.S. International Airlines received U.S. mail revenue for calendar years
with retroactive adjustment through April 21, 1949, as follows: 1946-$20,068,000;
1947-$33,288,000; 1948-$52,522,000.
* Principally borrowing from banks on equipment mortgage loans, term loans
and promissory notes, but also includes borrowing on notes from aircraft manu-
facturers, the RFC and other corporations.
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These figures were, of course, scaled down drastically when it became
evident that the expected expansion of traffic was not to materialize and also
by virtue of necessity when capital became difficult to raise..
It will be noted that debenture and preferred stock financing predomi-
nated until the beginning of 1947 and that, since that time, the large major-
ity of new funds have been obtained through bank loans.
Some of this bank loan was for equipment purchases and other similar
expenditures which would have been better financed through the sale of
securities.
There has, unfortunately for the industry, been comparatively little
equity financing. When equities could have been sold on a favorable basis,
during the period of high airline earnings (1945), most managements ex-
pected their stocks to sell still higher and consequently postponed equity
financing. Some were also attracted by the "leverage" potentialities for
their common stocks through raising a substantial part of their capital
through the issuance of senior securities.
As a result of these trends, the capital structure of the industry has
changed drastically since prewar days when the vast majority of airline
capitalization consisted of common stock.
Capitalization of Domestic Certificated Airlines
. Four Lines Having
Total Industry Long-Term Obligations
1940 1947 1940 1947
Common
Equity 81.6 36.2 76.7 18.0
Preferred
Stock 10.8 18.0 14.4 22.0
Debt 7.6 45.8 8.9 60.0
Total $52,218,000 $327,728,000 $35,413,000 $235,1q7,000
The degree to which the industry has burdened itself with short-term
obligations and fixed charges is indicated by the following tabulation:
Notes payable within one year ...................... $16,100,000*
Annual interest and sinking fund
payments on Debentures ........... .............. 5,258,000
Annual dividends on preferred stock ................. 2,356,000
Total .......................................... $23,742,000
Obviously, the proportion of bank loans to total capitalization is too
heavy, and substantial refunding operations will be necessary as soon as
market conditions and the industry's earnings record permit.
Moreover, the industry is in need of substantial amounts of new capital.
Although a few lines appear over-equipped with new aircraft, many need to
replace their obsolete DC3s and DC4s with modern Convair 240s, Martin 202s,
DC6s, Constellations or Strato-cruisers. The new equipment requirements
of the domestic lines, based .on present traffic expectations, is estimated at
some $100 millions. Total capital needs of the domestic industry over the




New flight equipment ................. 125
Total ............................... $225
* Not including interest charges estimated at roughly $2% to $3 million.
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Thanks to the heavy losses of the industry during the past three years
and, until recently, the uncertainty of Government policy toward it, airline
credit has been at a low ebb. If it continues at this level, it will be difficult,
if not impossible, for the airlines to obtain the capital funds necessary to
their sound future development.
V. REASONABLY PROMISING MEDIUM TERM OUTLOOK
Fortunately, there are signs that the industry has turned the corner
economically that its earnings outlook over the next two or three years is
relatively promising.
There are four principal reasons for taking this view:
1. The Government support required by the Civil Aeronautics Act is
likely to be furnished.
Regardless of mistakes made by airline managements and the CAB
over the past three years, the Civil Aeronautics Act (Sec. 406) clearly re-
quires that the Board allow adequate mail rates to permit any airline which
is honestly and efficiently managed to break even, and, in addition, earn a fair
return on its used and useful investment.
During 1946 and 1947, the CAB, as then constituted, failed to recognize
this responsibility. Its mail rate decisions in this period provided payments
which were far too small to offset the heavy losses which the airlines were
experiencing.
However, since the appointment of Joseph O'Connell as Chairman in
March, 1948, the Board has taken a much more clear cut view of its respon-
sibilities to provide adequate mail pay.
The so-called "Big Five" air mail decision of April, 1948, (retroactive
to January 1, 1948) increased the air mail rates of those carriers 30%. This
amount was estimated to be sufficient; to permit them to earn 10% on their
invested capital provided passenger traffic increased 10%.
However, instead of increasing, passenger volume in 1948 will actually
be 3% below 1947, due in part to the effect of a serious accident last June.
The grounding of the DC-6s in the first quarter of 1948 also resulted in a
large loss during the first quarter of the year.
In consequence, all five companies filed briefs in opposition to the April
rates as inadequate. They asked for increases which would have brought
the total annual mail pay to $48 millions as compared to the $20 millions
allowed in the Board's April decision and the $13 millions they received in
1947. In addition, some companies asked for large retroactive payments.
No action has been taken on these requests and a decision is not expected
until the late spring or early summer of 1949, following decisions on pending
international cases which are promised for this month. However, in the fall
of 1948, the Board issued several very favorable rate decisions in cases
involving smaller airlines which appear to constitute important precedents
for the pending "Big Five" cases.
Several of the decisions have granted retroactive mail payments equal to
roughly 60% of past losses during the period covered by the petition. Rates
for future service, in many cases, are double past rates and would seem
sufficient to ensure the companies a modest profit in 1949 at current levels of
passenger traffic.
Even more significant than the actual increases granted is the fact that
the Board has clearly interpreted the Civil Aeronautics Act as requiring the
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provision of adequate mail pay. To quote the Delta Air Lines decision of
September 8, 1948:
"Under Section 406 (b) of the Act, Delta is entitled to a mail rate which
will enable it under honest, economical and efficient management to
break even and which, in addition, will provide a fair return on Delta's
used and useful investment."
A large increase in air mail appropriations will be necessary to provide
the funds for the increased mail payments which the CAB is expected to
approve.
The following table compares actual payments for the fiscal years 1946
through 1948 with an estimate of the amount of mail pay which the airlines
would need to show a 10% profit on 70% of their investment.
2
This somewhat arbitrary figure indicates that air mail payments in the
1949 and subsequent fiscal years might total $130 million (excluding retro-
active payments) for both domestic and international lines-a $52 million
increase over fiscal 1948.
Though this is a substantial figure, it is very small as compared to the
estimated deficit on second class mail and the 1949 appropriation of $2,808
millions for the purchase of military and naval aircraft.
Large though this increase would be, it would only bring 1948 mail pay
to 20% of the industry's total 1948 revenue, or about the same percentage
as in 1942. The rates per ton mile would be somewhat more than in 1942 in
the case of the domestic airlines.
Domestic International Total
Total Revenues 1948 Fiscal Year... $374,906,000 $220,904,000 $595,810,000
Estimated Mail Pay Necessary for
10% Profit .................... 61,400,000 58,800,000 120,200,000
Percent of mail to total 1948 Rev-
enues ......................... 16.4% 26.6% 20.2%
Mail rate per ton mile on 1948 volume $1.83 $4.18. $2.52
Percent Mail Revenue to Total Rev-
enue-1942 (calendar) ........... 21.7% 34.8% 25.5%
Mail rate per ton mile-1942--cal-
endar ......................... $1.10 $9.92 $1.71
In considering requests for increased air mail appropriations, the Con-
gress will have in mind the very strong recommendations of the President's
Air Policy Commission and the Congressional Aviation Policy Board for the
development of a healthy air transport industry as an important adjunct of
national defense. These recommendations did not receive adequate attention
during the last Congress because the expansion of our military air forces,
which was also recommended by these policy groups, quite properly received
first priority. However, the first stage of our aviation program is now well
underway and the importance of air transport has since been highlighted by
the dramatic achievements of the Berlin air lift.
The atmosphere in the new Congress should, therefore, be favorable for
a full-dress review of the degree of government support required by our air
transport system.
The large Democratic majority in the Congress would appear to remove
the danger of a change in the CAB Chairmanship and of a politically
inspired investigation of the CAB and the industry as a whole, which had
been feared in some quarters.
2 On the average, the CAB has usually allowed 70% of airline assets in esti-
mating return on invested capital.
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2. Probability that the present excessive competition will be reduced by
merger or otherwise over the next five years.
Increased mail pay alone will not be sufficient to put the air transport
industry on a thoroughly sound basis. Means must also be found to reduce
the present degree of competition, while at the same time retaining the
competitive urge so essential in spurring management to greater efficiency
and technical progress.
There is little doubt that the present route structure is unsound. Between
1941 and 1948 the CAB, responding to the requests of the airlines for new
routes, has expanded the total domestic certificated route mileage from
46,653 to 111,342. Much of this expansion was necessary to adequately serve
the country, but a great deal was not. It has created a number of basically
uneconomic systems, due to the attempt to "make big carriers out of little
ones." It has also resulted in competition so intense as to be destructive in
a number of cases. The fifty pairs of cities having the densest traffic between
them is an example. In 1940, only 9.8% of the traffic between these pairs was
competitive. By 1948, 54% was competitive and four airlines are actually
competing with each other between pairs accounting for 13% of the total
traffic. Moreover, some cities have been granted service which appear inca-
pable of developing an adequate amount of traffic for some time to come.
One major carrier claims that if it were permitted to drop some 40 points on
its system which provide only 8% of its total revenue, it could save $4 mil-
lions per year.
The solution of these problems will not be easy. Management could do a
great deal to reduce the destructive effects of existing competition by giving
up the over-scheduling in which so many of them indulge in order to exert
the maximum pressure on competitors. If they do not do so, it is possible
that the Board may exercise its power to control schedules, which it has in
the case of the so-called "need" (subsidy) carriers.
The reconstitution of unsound systems and the reduction of competition
through mergers, though eminently desirable, is more difficult still. To make
such mergers possible many "personal and corporate ambitions will have to
be relinquished," and the financial pressure for either mergers or manage-
ment changes has been greatly reduced by recent and prospective increases in
mail rates.
Nevertheless, the Board is doing everything in its power to encourage
mergers and the Congress will probably do likewise. The Congressional
Aviation Policy Board made specific reference in its report to the necessity
of reorganizing the route structure, and if voluntary mergers are too long in
coming Congress may well grant the CAB powers to require the necessary
changes.
3. Increase in Fares and Reduction in Costs.
In recent months domestic airlines have substantially increased passenger
fares, and at the same time experimented profitably with special reduced
fares for family travel and "second class" service. The average passenger
fare for the industry in September, 1948, was 6 cents a mile as compared to
4.76 cents in 1946. Further experimentation with the fare structure may do
much to increase both volume and total gross.
The air transport industry has done well, thanks principally to techno-
logical improvements, to keep its ton mile costs at or below the 1939 level.
This has been accomplished despite an increase of 116% in the average
hourly wage rate (all manufacturing industries) and 112% in commodity
prices in this period.
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The industry's costs per available ton mile rose from 27.7 cents in 1941
to 32.3 cents at the height of the expansion of 1946. Since that time there
have been marked reductions. One leading carrier has reduced its available
ton mile costs from 28.0 cents in the third quarter of 1946 to 26.1 cents in
the third quarter of 1948. Its break-down load factor has been cut from
79.1% to 54.5% in the same period.
Other substantial cost savings are possible, particularly in the realm of
consolidated use of ground services, but such saving will only serve to reduce
the dependence of the industry on mail pay. Reduction of costs to the point
where the airlines can tap a much larger "mass transportation" market
appears far in the future.
4. Probable Medium Term Growth in Traffic
So much attention has been given to the excessively optimistic traffic
predictions of the past that there is danger of going to the opposite extreme
and assuming that the domestic airlines are to be permanently limited to a.
volume of six billion passenger miles a year.
While most estimates of 1949 traffic do not assume any very great in-
crease, there are several factors which may make for substantial growth
over the next five years.
(1) Due to the rearmament boom or possibly war the total volume
of non-local travel may rise.
(2) With the improvement of safety and regularity-which should
be steady and cumulative over the next five years, as new air-
craft gets the "bugs" worked out of them, and air navigation
facilities are improved-the airlines should obtain an increas-
ingly large percentage of the non-local transportation market
even at present rates.
The spectacular accidents and relatively poor regularity record
of the last three years have played an important part in holding
passenger volume down.
(3) Looking still further ahead, the cargo business may prove an
important source of profit five to ten years hence. The introduc-
tion of turbo power and jet transports at this time will improve
the quality of passenger service.
Airline securities are not normally thought of as "war stocks," but it is
well to remember that in the last war they proved extremely profitable enter-
prises, thanks to their ability to run at very high load factors and, in
addition, carry out profitable contracts for special services rendered to the
government. In consequence air transport stocks performed considerably
better than the Dow Jones averages during this period.
There is every probability that the same situation would exist in a future
war, subject, of course, to special taxation which would presumably be
imposed on all industries.
VI. - PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
On the basis of the facts outlined in the preceding survey, we have come
to the following conclusions about the air transport industry's current prob-
lems and the steps which can and should be taken to cure them.
1. The present capital structure of many airlines appears unsatisfactory
for a business subject to as many unpredictable fluctuations as air transpor-
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tation. The proportion of bank loans and long term funded debt appears far
too high in some cases.
Financing of flight equipment purchases through long term debt seems
unwise. The maturities of bonds and debentures should not, in our opinion,
run substantially beyond the time when the assets purchased with funds
received from the sale of these securities are fully depreciated.
2. The air transport industry is in need of substantial amounts of equity
capital within the near future to refund bank loans and long term debt, pro-
vide funds for moderate flight and ground equipment purchases and increase
working capital.
3. The industry's ability to raise this new capital will depend on (1) the
state of the securities market and (2) the assurance that the airlines will
have substantial earning power over the next few years and real growth
possibilities over the long term future.
4. The credit of the airlines is in the hands of the Civil Aeronautics
Board and the Congress. The industry has made real progress in reducing its
high operating costs resulting from post-war over-expansion. However, with
the low mail rates which the major lines are now receiving it appears almost
impossible for many companies to achieve adequate earnings at current levels
of traffic. For major lines increases in traffic in the near future seem unlikely.
The restoration of substantial earning power in the near term future will
therefore require a major increase in air mail rates by the Civil Aeronautics
Board and the appropriation by the Congress of the sums necessary to pay
these rates.
The policies established in the Civil Aeronautics Act and the importance
of air transportation to the national defense fully justify such increases.
Past expenditures on air mail have been almost wholly offset by revenues
from stamp sales. Fortunately recent decisions of the CAB in the case of
the smaller lines indicate that it is embarking on a more liberal mail rate
policy.
5. There should also be some assurance that, once set, the higher rates
will be left in effect long enough to permit the airlines to restore their pre-
vious losses and build up adequate reserves. The Civil Aeronautics Board's
previous error of drastically reducing mail rates in anticipation of a high
level of traffic and earnings, which did not materialize, must not be repeated.
It must be remembered that any recession in general business might
easily wipe out the modest earning power which higher prices would establish.
6. Increased regularity and safety are necessary to ensure the long term
growth of the industry and reduce its dependence on subsidy. To this end
the government's fifteen-year program for modernizing our system of radio
aids to navigation should be carried out as rapidly as possible. Real all-
weather flying combined with a safety record equal to that of scheduled
surface transportation depends on the success of this program. The facilities
it contemplates will be of inestimable value to national defense.
7. The most modern and efficient transport aircraft are necessary for
our national defense, as well as for the progress of the air transport industry.
Witness the work of the Air Transport Command in the last war and the
Berlin air lift today.
New types of transport aircraft must be developed whenever advances in
the art of aviation make it probable that major improvements in performance
and economy over existing types are possible. Federal financial assistance
will be necessary for the development of new prototypes and was recom-
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mended by the President's Air Policy Commission and the Congressional
Aviation Policy Board. The next Congress should enact legislation liecessary
to assure government financed prototype development.
8. A truly sound air transport system cannot be achieved without major
revision of the present network to substantially reduce destructive compe-
tition and reconstitute, through merger or otherwise, those systems which
are so inherently weak as to in all probability require heavy subsidy for a
long time to come. The competitive urge must be retained if air transporta-
tion is to continue the rapid technical advance which is an essential basis for
its economic progress, but is should be possible to retain the spur of compe-
tition in a reorganized national route structure which would comprise a much
smaller number of individual systems than at present.
A serious attempt should be made to achieve the reorganization of the
route pattern through voluntary mergers. If this cannot be accomplished
within a reasonable time-and the failure of the I.C.C. to achieve a similar
reorganization of the railroads in the past thirty years indicates that it
probably cannot-the Congress should give the Civil Aeronautics Board
power to require the necessary reorganizations.
9. Equipment trust financing, the creation of corporations to lease flight
equipment, or R.F.C. loans for equipment purchases or working capital,
will not solve the airlines' basic problem of inadequate earnings. These types
of financing derive their worth from the basic credit of the airline concerned.
However, when the industry's basic credit problem is solved, equipment
trust financing or aircraft leasing corporations may prove useful financing
tools. The program now under way for eliminating legal obstacles to such
types of financing should be accelerated. Federal recording and the elimi-
nation of tort liability has been accomplished. Amendment of the Bank-
ruptcy Act to give the holder of equipment trust certificates the right of
immediate repossession in case of bankruptcy should be carried out as soon
as possible.
10. There is too much competition among certificated carriers for the
volume of traffic which now exists. The Board should take prompt action
against illegal competition by allegedly non-scheduled carriers which are
really operating scheduled service. Such services should also be strictly
policed from the safety standpoint in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Aeronautics Act.'
11. The Civil Aeronautics Board should not, in our opinion, be given the
power to regulate the issuance of airline securities. The determination of
the form and extent of financing is essentially a management function to
which the investment banking industry can make a valuable contribution.
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